Nonhuman animal farming, by its fundamental nature, involves a greater or lesser degree of ill treatment and oppression. Definitions of abuse or cruelty in relation to nonhumans, however, are inconsistent and ambiguous. People support nonhuman farming by purchasing its products, but the majority of people do not themselves mistreat nonhumans. How can this incongruity be explained? Any account is likely to be complex, but work in experimental psychology has identified a number of conditions that can contribute toward individuals becoming morally disengaged from abusive acts. This paper shows that a number of these conditions are embedded in the nonhuman animal farming industry, thus providing some insight into why consumers may be disconnected from the mass abuse carried out by an industry they support. Recognizing this process can help advocates for nonhumans take steps to counter this disengagement and so allow consumers to examine their ethical choices more clearly.
Introduction
Worldwide, approximately 55,000,000,000 land-based nonhumans are killed every year in the farming industry (United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, 2010) . This is over 150 million individuals each day or the equivalent of the populations of South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Botswana, and Angola (US Census Bureau, 2010). Except for a very tiny minority, all the nonhumans in the industry will meet with a violent death at a relatively young age; all will have been confined during their lives; many will have been mutilated; numerous females will have been repeatedly made pregnant but their young taken away shortly after birth; family structures will have been destroyed (Compassion in World Farming, 2009; Mitchell, 2008; Phillips, 2001) . Although this description defines the essential practices of nonhuman farming, the underlying morality of the industry receives scant attention from the general public, who for the most part support it vigorously by their purchases and consumption (United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, 2002) . It seems reasonable to ask why this should be so.
The answer to that question is likely to be complex, with such factors as tradition, culture, the legal system, and commercial drivers all playing a part, but in this paper I show how certain conditions are embedded in the farming industry that may contribute to enabling people to disengage from the abusive results of their actions. My starting point is to ask, how can we describe the treatment of nonhumans used in nonhuman farming?
Abuse
Given what is done to nonhumans, as outlined above, the term abuse seems appropriate, but it raises a number of problems. The first is that the word suggests the misuse of something, with the implication that there must be a correct and acceptable use for that thing. We do not infer this, however, when describing the abuse of women or children, and the term, when used in relation to living things, usually has the meaning of maltreatment, as in, "cruel, violent or unfair treatment, especially of someone who does not have the power to prevent it." 1 But even if this is the generally accepted meaning, definitions of abuse and cruelty relating to nonhumans are often ambiguous. Ascione has written extensively about the abuse of nonhumans and defines it in broad legal terms as "socially unacceptable behaviour that intentionally causes unnecessary pain, suffering or distress to and/or death of an animal" (Ascione, 1993, p. 228) . In some instances, definitions depend upon the species of nonhuman who is the recipient of the action, while in other cases, some acts count as abuse or cruelty in one situation but not in another. For example, section 959.13 of the State of Ohio animal cruelty statute has the following:
A) No person shall: (1) Torture an animal, deprive one of necessary sustenance, unnecessarily or cruelly beat, needlessly mutilate or kill, or impound or confine an animal without supplying it during such confinement with a sufficient quantity of good wholesome food and water . . .
(4) Keep animals other than cattle, poultry or fowl, swine, sheep, or goats in an enclosure without wholesome exercise and change of air, or feed cows on food that produces impure or unwholesome milk . . . (Animal Legal and Historical Center, 2009) What does it mean to unnecessarily beat, cruelly beat, or needlessly mutilate? When is beating necessary and/or not cruel, and when is mutilation needed, and who needs the mutilation? Paragraph four highlights the point that cruelty in this dispensation also depends upon the particular species of nonhumans under consideration, and from this section, "cattle, poultry or fowl, swine, sheep, or goats" are specifically excluded. Davis (2009) notes that in a another context nonhumans are disqualified from legal protection altogether, pointing out that in the United States nonhumans who are used in agricultural research are not protected by the Animal Welfare Act (p. 179). The Animal Welfare Act of the United Kingdom is also ambiguous and speaks of causing "unnecessary suffering" and of it being an offense to carry out "mutilation" on nonhumans unless that procedure is "approved" (Animal Welfare Act, 2006, pp. 2, 3) .
The problem with descriptions such as those above is that they are normative and reflect society's attitudes, interests, and instrumentalist desires. As Becker (2001) 
notes:
Defining animal cruelty is problematic, because of the existence of socially and culturally sanctioned activities which can harm animals, differing attitudes towards different species, and a continuum of severity that can range from teasing to torture. (p. 2) Agnew (1998) acknowledges the complications of using the term abuse and defines the abuse of a nonhuman as "any act that contributes to the pain or death of an animal or that otherwise threatens the welfare of an animal" (p. 179). He expands on this as follows:
Such abuse may be physical (including sexual) or mental, may involve active maltreatment or passive neglect, may be direct or indirect, intentional or unintentional, socially approved or condemned, and/or necessary or unnecessary (however defined). (p. 179) This is clear and unambiguous and does not depend upon social mores or societal or personal interests. This is the definition of abuse that I will apply within this paper.
Do people support the abuse of nonhumans?
The answer to this question is no and yes. Because of factors such as underreporting, it is difficult to obtain accurate statistics for the true level of legally defined abuse, and there are likely to be wide geographical variations, but it appears that the majority of people in the United States and the United Kingdom, for example, do not personally abuse nonhumans (Pet-Abuse.com, 2010; BBC, 2007; Gerbasi, 2004) . For the year 2008 the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals in the United Kingdom (2010) obtained 2,574 convictions for cruelty, which is certainly significant but in a population of 61 million represents a relatively small percentage of individuals (UK Office for National Statistics, 2009) . People in the countries of the European Union put a high value on farmed nonhuman animal welfare (European Commission, 2007) , and "over four in five EU citizens declare that we have a duty to protect animal rights regardless [of ] the cost" (European Commission, 2005, p. 26) . In the United States in 2006 72 million dogs and 82 million cats were kept as companion animals, with 49.7% of the human guardians of companion animals saying that they "considered their pets to be family members" (American Veterinary Medical Association, 2009, para. 1). Overall it is reasonable to say that people in the United States and countries of the European Union do not, as a general principal, support the abuse of nonhuman animals.
Why are some nonhumans abused? Agnew (1998) , drawing on a wide range of research, outlines three major explanations for the abuse of nonhuman animals or "the immediate determinants of animal abuse" (p. 182): 1) ignorance, 2) some form of justification, and 3) the perceived benefits of such acts.
He proposes that people may be ignorant of the consequences of their behavior; they may be ignorant of how their behavior affects the treatment of nonhumans; and they may be ignorant about the extent and ability of nonhumans to suffer. He also describes how we are physically isolated from the "negative consequences of our actions" (p. 184), as well as symbolically isolated from them by such things as the packaging of nonhuman farming products and the linguistic terms used for describing flesh and the killing of nonhumans. We may also be reassured by authorities that the nonhumans in question are treated very well (Agnew, 1998) . Concerning Agnew's second explanation-the justification of nonhuman abuse-individuals may believe that nonhumans deserve abuse, that their suffering serves some higher purpose, that the abuse prevents further nonhuman suffering, and/or there may be a denial or diffusion of personal responsibility (Agnew, 1998) . For example, people may feel justified in killing nonhumans designated as vermin; vivisection might be seen as serving some greater good; nonhumans might be euthanized to prevent "further suffering"; and meat producers can claim to be producing a product demanded by people other than themselves. The abusers may also point to the behavior of those who bring their activities to light as itself being unacceptable (Agnew, 1998) . Finally, it may be perceived that the benefits of abuse outweigh the cost, as for example in making money from abusing nonhumans in a whole range of ways from farming to horse racing (Agnew, 1998) .
While legally defined abuse, such as torturing a companion nonhuman, is not a phenomenon to be dismissed, I will, using Agnew's definition, focus on the legally condoned abuse of nonhumans in the farming industry. This abuse is orders of magnitude greater than that recognized by legal systems and worldwide affects at least 55 trillion individuals each year (United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, 2010).
Some theories about why people abuse nonhumans, such as strain theory, attempt to explain why individuals would actually carry out abuse, while others can help to explain the support of abuse that is physically carried out by others. For example, strain theory might be used to help understand the actions of a poor person beating a donkey who has eaten his cabbages, while moral disengagement might be used to explain how an "animal lover" happily takes on an assignment to build a vivisection laboratory. Agnew (1998) draws on the work of a range of authors and theories, including Bandura and moral disengagement theory, specifically with respect to individuals justifying or excusing abuse, euphemistic labeling, and selective inattention and distortion. He also refers to the work of Benton and others concerning the diffusion of responsibility (Agnew, 1998) . Later I will look at moral disengagement and related work in experimental social psychology that gives further insight into support for the mass abuse of nonhumans in farming, but first, a brief look at human-human mass violence as a phenomenon.
Mass Violence
It is tempting, when incidents of mass violence occur, to look for perpetrators who are severely psychologically aberrant, but research on examples of humanhuman mass murder suggests that, while such perpetrators do exist, they are relatively rare and that for atrocities to be committed on a large scale, they require the participation of ordinary people. This is what Arendt (1994) refers to as "the banality of evil" (p. 287). Weiss (1996) describes the part played by ordinary members of the population during the Holocaust and how this phenomenon required the complicity of tens of thousands of people working in a whole range of public and private institutions with occupations such as police officers, civil servants, railway workers, soldiers, bankers, scientists, judges, postal workers, bureaucrats, and doctors. Established companies used their expertise to provide facilities and supplies, just as they would have done for any other commercial projects. The building firm of Robert Kohler took part in the construction of Auschwitz; Topf and Sons of Erfurt put together the ovens, W. Reidel and Son and Joseph Kluge of Geiwitz supplied reinforced concrete, and Dessau Sugar and Chemical Factories and the German Pest Control Company provided the Zyklon B gas (Glass, 1997, p. 86) .
There is an ordinariness about the whole process of mass slaughter when it develops into the everyday, the mundane. Writing of the genocide in Rwanda and his interviews with perpetrators, Mironko (2006) notes:
The flat tone together with the third person the speakers frequently used in their stories suggests distancing devices rather than complete lack of sentiment. What emerges overall, though, is how ordinary these killings seem to the perpetrators and how casually the speakers still seem to regard their participation in them. (p. 184) Without the complicity of ordinary people, large-scale violence cannot happen, but why do people support mass violence and oppression? For an insight into this question it is helpful to examine a section of research carried out in experimental social psychology over the last 25 years. I will therefore look briefly at some of the work of Milgram, Zimbardo, and Bandura.
Experimental Social Psychology and Mass Violence
Zimbardo (2004) highlights both our bewilderment and our struggle to understand the occurrence of mass violence when he writes:
We continue to ask, why? Why and how is it possible for such deeds to occur? How can the unimaginable become so readily imagined? These are the same questions that have been asked by generations before ours. (p. 23) He describes two approaches to examining the "antisocial behaviour of individuals and violence sanctioned by nations" (p. 21). One focuses on the individual, so as to find errant behavioral traits or psychological risk factors, while the alternative looks at the situations in which people find themselves and the influences these have upon them (Zimbardo, 2004, p. 21 ). As we are considering mass violence perpetrated with the complicity of millions of people, I will look further at this second perspective.
Milgram and Authority
From 1960 to 1963, Milgram carried out experiments that looked at the obedience level of experimental subjects in following commands, some of which they believed, if carried out, would cause suffering to another person or even put their life in danger (Milgram, 1974) . He carried out a number of experimental investigations that had as their central modus operandi a subject being told by the experimenter to give a person electric shocks of varying levels (Milgram, 1974) . The reason for doing this, the subjects were informed, was to try to better understand how people learn. The overall results were surprising in that they suggested that ordinary Americans were willing to follow commands from an authority even if it meant causing severe pain to another person and possibly even putting that person's life in danger. Milgram notes, "It is the extreme willingness of adults to go to almost any lengths on the command of an authority that constitutes the chief finding of the study" (p. 5).
Following his original work, Milgram went on to carry out further laboratory simulations on over a thousand subjects in different experimental situations, and Zimbardo (2004) describes some of the "influence principles" Milgram found that enable people to act in abusive ways that are counter to their own and others' expectations (pp. 27-28). People needed some acceptable justification or rationale for what they did; there needed to be meaningful roles with learned positive values, as well as basic rules to be followed; and there had to be opportunities for the diffusion of responsibility. Changing the language used to describe what was done was important, as were: increasing the violent acts by small increments; a gradual movement away from a reasonable and just authority; some contractual obligation; and making the exit costs high (Zimbardo, 2004 ). Milgram's work also shows that the greater the psychological and physical distance between the perpetrator and the victim, the easier it is to inflict pain (Milgram, 1974, pp. 32-43) . Being able to see and/or hear the consequences of causing pain significantly reduces an individual's willingness to inflict it.
Similar studies have generally supported Milgram's original work (Miller, 2005) . For the purposes of this discussion, I will approach his findings as identifying possible contributing factors that, combined with others, might explain why ordinary people support or permit mass violence in some form.
Zimbardo and Deindividuation
Zimbardo (2004) investigated the process of deindividuation whereby perpetrators and/or victims have their individuality removed, which changes the agent's willingness to inflict pain and discomfort on the patient. The procedure followed in one investigation was to have young women deliver electric shocks to other young women. Half of those delivering the electric shocks had been deindividuated by being given identifying numbers and having their appearance concealed, while the other half were made to feel unique and were called by their names; both groups were given the same cover story, which Zimbardo describes as "the big lie they never questioned" (Zimbardo, 2004, p. 29) . The deindividuated women delivered twice as much shock as the individuated ones, and the individuated women shocked "pleasant victims" less (Zimbardo, p. 29) . Zimbardo concludes:
Anything that makes a person feel anonymous, as if no one knows who he or she is, creates the potential for that person to act in evil ways-if the situation gives permission for violence. (p. 29) Similar research into very different subjects, such as violent crime in Northern Ireland (Silke, 2003) , warriors from different cultures (Watson, 1973) , and eleven-year-olds playing sport in Germany (Rehm, Steinleitner, & Lilli, 1987) appears to support this basic thesis.
In the famous Stanford Prison Experiment, Zimbardo (2004) looked at how ordinary young men reacted to being placed in a "prison" environment either as guards or prisoners. The men were all volunteers and were screened beforehand to make sure they had no history of drug use, crime, or violence and no experience of playing the roles of either prisoners or guards. The 24 healthiest individuals were chosen to take part and randomly assigned the roles of prisoners or guards and a realistic prison situation was created at the Stanford University Psychology Department (Zimbardo, Haney, Banks, & Jaffe, 1999) .
The experiment was scheduled to run for two weeks but had to be terminated after only six days because "[p]acific young men were behaving sadistically in their role as guards, inflicting humiliation and pain and suffering on other young men who had the inferior status of prisoner" (Zimbardo, 2004, p. 40) . Important aspects of this experiment are the anonymity of the participants-both guards and prisoners-as well as a social structure allowing for, and condoning, certain attitudes and actions. Essentially, the situational forces triumphed over the positive dispositions of the people involved (Zimbardo, 2004, p. 40) . Here there is no authority directing the acts but rather anonymous perpetrators abusing anonymous victims and social channels that permit that to happen. Bandura (1999 Bandura ( , 2002 describes mechanisms that produce moral disengagement, whereby a person's own moral controls can be disengaged from the abusive actions they are carrying out. The mechanisms he identifies are: moral justification; euphemistic labeling; displacement of responsibility; diffusion of responsibility; disregard for, or distortion of, the consequences; dehumanization; attribution of blame; advantageous comparison; and the power of progressive moral disengagement (Bandura, 2002, pp. 103-110) .
Bandura and Moral Disengagement
Considering that this paper is about nonhumans, it is interesting to consider briefly one of Bandura's investigations that actually relates to the use of the word animals. Bandura, Underwood, and Fromson (1975) devised a situation where college students were able to "overhear" a research assistant telling an experimenter that a group of students from another college were ready to start the experiment and then either: 1) not describing them at all; 2) describing them in a pleasant, humanistic way; or 3) describing them as an "animalistic, rotten bunch" (p. 258). The original college students were then asked to give electric shocks to the students from the other college. The highest level of shock was given to those students labeled "animals" and that shock level increased linearly over the ten trials. Zimbardo, commenting on this research, notes, "Thus, a single word-animals-was sufficient to incite intelligent college students to treat those so labelled as if they deserved to be harmed " (Zimbardo, 2004, p 32 ; emphasis in the original). Clearly, the word animal meant more to these students than a simple biological classification; it was a marker that gave them permission to do harm. I will return later to the subtle and potent effects of language on the actions of individuals.
Nonhuman Farming and Conditions Allowing People to Disengage from the Consequences of their Actions
The research outlined above suggests that, for human-human violence, certain conditions help facilitate a willingness to carry out violent acts. While the research discussed pertains to the active participation of individuals in abuse, what I am interested in here is one step removed from that situation; I will be focusing on support for abuse. It might be that the efficacy of some of the conditions is reduced by this distance, or it may be that their efficacy is enhanced, for example, by not having to carry out the abuse personally. Whichever is the case, I suggest that many of the conditions identified above are integral to nonhuman animal farming. This may, in part, explain why consumers (who for the most part do not support animal abuse) continue to support the farming industry financially.
Conditions
Positive Roles. The farming of nonhumans may be seen by society as a normal, worthwhile, and even essential practice (Shortfall, 2007) . Many people working in the industry have meaningful, positive roles such as the farmer, the shopkeeper, the pie maker, the cobbler, and even the old-fashioned butcher. Certainly they are seldom, if ever, portrayed in the popular media as people involved in, or contributing toward, the abuse or oppression of nonhumans.
Channels for action. Established societal channels for nonhuman farming and basic rules for how nonhumans are to be treated in the farming industry exist There are logistical systems in place, financial incentives, organizations, social roles, expectations, customers, and legislation governing the types of abuse that may be legally practiced. It only requires that those who wish to farm nonhumans or who wish to support the industry make use of what is already available.
Justification and advantageous comparison. The use of nonhumans in farming is so commonplace and "commonsensical" that often no justification is needed. If one is required, however, it often takes the form of subscribing to some account of teleological anthropocentrism, where nonhumans are seen as lesser beings who are being rightfully used for the purposes for which they are believed to exist. This theme of a hierarchically constructed universe composed of greater and lesser beings is sometimes called the "Great Chain of Being" (Wise, 2001, p. 11) . Spiegel (1996) points out that, before the wide acceptance of evolutionary theory, "civilized" white Christian human beings were placed above all other beings, giving them an excellent justification for the subjugation of black people and nonhuman animals. With time, the source of the justification shifted from a religious base to Social Darwinism, but the oppression continued with "unmitigated violence towards the 'lower' animals and the enslavement of black 'savages' in Africa" (Spiegel, 1996, p. 21) .
The myth of ascending evolution, particularly as it applies to human "superiority," has been ridiculed by Gould (1989; 1991) . He writes that "[t]he familiar iconographies of evolution are all directed-sometimes crudely sometimes subtly-towards reinforcing a comfortable view of human inevitability and superiority" (Gould, 1989, p. 28) . Furthermore, he maintains that it is only those relatively unsuccessful groups, such as the horse with just one or two survivors, whose evolutionary paths can be misrepresented in the form a ladder. Very successful groups such as bats or antelopes, which have many members, are not represented in this way. He makes the point that this is really about our belief in the centrality of humans to all things:
I need hardly remind everybody that at least one other mammalian lineage, preeminent among all in our attention and concern, shares with horses the sorry state of reduction from a formally luxuriant bush to a single surviving twig-the very property of tenuousness that permits us to build a ladder reaching only to the heart of our own folly and hubris. (Gould 1991, p.181) Cullinan (2002) places this misguided concept in a uniquely South African perspective when he compares the belief of the dominant cultures of the world today in the superiority of the human species to the beliefs of some South Africans, who were once convinced of their right to oppress others in their country. This ideology may be covert or even unconscious, but at times it is stated openly, as with the claim that it is the purpose of "food animals" to serve humankind (Dunayer, 2001, p. 146) .
There is also moral justification for nonhuman farming from legal systems that fully support it and from mainstream religions, which for the most part condone it (BBC, 2009; Food and Religion, 2000) . As Linzey (2007) He goes on to argue that theologians, instead of celebrating the "kinship of all life" develop more and more ingenious ways of distinguishing between human and nonhuman animals "as if evolutionary biology never existed" (Linzey, 2007, p. 7) .
The taking of a nonhuman life might be deemed of little or no significance by employing an advantageous comparison between humans and nonhumans. "Only man dies. The animal perishes," claims Heidegger (cited in Cavalieri, 2006, p. 62) , while Schopenhauer asserts that "the pain animals suffer through death is not so great as humans would suffer by denying themselves their flesh" (cited in Cavalieri, 2006, p. 60) .
Distance. Nonhuman farming, particularly large-scale farming, is usually carried out away from the main centers of human habitation, with nonhumans killed and their bodies disassembled in anonymous industrial buildings. This creates both physical and psychological distance in relation to the majority of consumers of nonhuman products, factors that Milgram (1974) identifies as being crucially important in affecting a person's willingness to inflict pain. It seems reasonable that our willingness to allow others to inflict pain and death on our behalf further enhances this displacement and reduces our connection to the acts. The human population as a whole has little, if any, contact with living farmed nonhumans, and, as Stibbe (2003) notes concerning intensive pig farming, "Now the relationship between pigs and humans is one of distance . . . the only contact most people have with pigs is on the dinner plate" (Abstract).
Reducing this distance is a factor that may have dramatic effects on people's engagement with our killing of nonhumans. In 2001 in the United Kingdom there was an outbreak of foot and mouth disease, and the British government attempted to arrest and contain the epidemic by carrying out a massive cull of both affected nonhumans and those healthy ones in the areas around affected farms (Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs [UK], 2009; Allender, 2002; National Audit Office [UK], 2002) . In the epidemic, there were 2,026 cumulative recorded cases of foot and mouth disease while the number of nonhumans slaughtered was over 6 million-the total for calves and lambs is not known, as their "value" was included in their mother's "value" (National Audit Office [UK], 2002, pp. 1, 17, 111) . During the cull the British public was confronted on a continual basis with news coverage of the slaughter and the disposal of the corpses, and many people had their own personal experiences. This clearly had a psychological impact (Mort, Convery, Baxter, & Bailey, 2005; Allender, 2002) .
At Great Orton Airfield in Cumbria, 466,312 nonhumans are buried in 26 trenches; a hidden wall 12 meters deep surrounds the site to prevent the seepage of fluids (Visit Cumbria, 2005) . Despite the fact that these were nonhumans who would normally have been killed in the farming industry as a matter of mundane routine, the site has now become a memorial and wildlife reserve known as Watchtree. The reserve has, at its entrance, a large stone bearing a plaque of remembrance for the nonhumans who died (Fig. 1) .
Over 26 million sheep, pigs, and cattle were slaughtered in the "food chain" in the United Kingdom in 2001 (National Audit Office [UK], 2002, p. 18), but they were awarded no such monument of remembrance.
Linguistics. The construction of detrimental discourses concerning farmed nonhumans is well recognized, as are other negative or obscuring linguistic practices (Mitchell, 2006; Dunayer, 2001; Stibbe, 2001) . The manipulation of language, as, for example, by changing semantics or using euphemistic labeling, facilitates moral disengagement. Euphemistic labeling is common, for example, in the use of terms such as culling, processing, and harvesting instead of more explicit words for killing (Dunayer, 2001, p. 137) . Dunayer (2001) describes how the United Kingdom's Meat Trades Journal told its readers to replace the use of slaughterhouse with meat plant or meat factory, while in an editorial titled "Let's Kill 'Slaughtering,'" Meat Processing warned that the term slaughtering hurts the industry's image. In a similar vein, the National Cattlemen's Association directed its members to purge the word slaughter from their vocabularies and substitute instead process or harvest or to say that animals "go to market" (p. 137).
Even the same word may have a different connotation when used for nonhumans as compared to humans. According to Jepson (2008) , "When referring to the killing of animals, slaughter is devoid of emotional content or ethical evaluation" unlike its use in relation to humans (p. 143).
Farmed nonhumans may also be linguistically reified as production machines or objects of scientific investigation (Mitchell, 2006 (Mitchell, , 2008 . The South African Livestock and Stud Book Association (2005) says about Beefmaster cattle, "The Beefmaster is a meat machine. The more effective the better. Any other goals are merely for show" (p. 3). Gittens describes a cattle farmer who produces a similar construction: Figure 1 . Plaque of remembrance at Watchtree Nature Reserve [The farmer] is a great believer in the fact that cattle farmers are not simply raising beef, but are rather selling grass that has been converted into beef by their cattle. (Gittens, 2005, p. 40) Farmed nonhumans are also subjects for scientific manipulation, as revealed by the following paragraph relating to the taste and texture of flesh:
DNA samples from 100 Ngunis were sent to Australia for GeneStar testing. As many as 97% of them had the tenderness gene, but lacked the marbling gene, seemingly suggesting the benefits of crossing Ngunis with the Pustertaler, which has both genes. (Miles, 2005, p. 37) Metonymy is "the substitution of the name of an attribute or adjunct for that of the thing meant, for example suit for business executive, or the turf for horse racing."
2 Phrases such as slaughter lambs, red beef animals, dairy calves, breeding cattle, commercial Mutton Merino sheep, wool sheep, and broilers portray nonhumans purely in terms of the use to which humans will put them, thereby creating or reinforcing the understanding that this is the actual purpose of the nonhuman's life (Mitchell, 2008, pp. 234-237) . These and other linguistic devices can also contribute to justification and advantageous comparison.
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa investigating the atrocities of apartheid noted that " [l] anguage, discourse and rhetoric does things: it constructs social categories, it gives orders, it persuades us, it justifies, it explains, gives reasons, excuses" (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 1998, para. 124) . Careful, reflective, and direct use of language is therefore an important tool for those wishing to oppose the dominant power structures that seek to oppress and exploit nonhumans.
Deindividuation and responsibility. By far the greatest majority of farmed nonhumans are not named or individualized in any meaningful way. They are considered en masse, as such things as stock, investments, production units, or replacements for other nonhumans, but not as sentient individuals with interests in life (Dunayer, 2001, pp. 140-143) . They are deindividuated in the farming industry, and consumers purchase commodities that have no obvious relation to individual, sentient beings with life interests.
Billions of consumers purchase nonhuman animal products, so it is difficult to assign any personal responsibility for the death of a calf to an individual who is purchasing a pack of burgers or a container of milk. Although, by their actions these consumers support the phenomenon of nonhuman farming, they are anonymous buyers of goods and so are themselves essentially deinviduated. A person may consider that many other people are doing the same thing as them, feeling that the meat industry will not stop because he or she, as an individual, fails to buy its products and also that the calf has, anyway, already been killed. In this way there is the potential for displacement of responsibility (I didn't ask anyone to do it), as well as diffusion of responsibility (other people buy these products, so it wasn't done for me personally, and it would happen anyway).
Another example from the British foot and mouth outbreak of 2001 is also relevant here, but this time concerning the opposite of deindividuation. Browne writes about Phoenix, the calf whose mother was slaughtered in the cull, but who somehow managed to survive, having stayed with her dead mother and the putrefying remains of other nonhumans in a barn for five days before being discovered (Browne, 2001) . When the story came out, the Ministry of Agriculture insisted that she be killed, and a slaughterer was sent to the farm, accompanied by a police officer, to carry out the directive. The owners refused, however, informing the official that he would have to get a court injunction. Soon the story was in the public domain, and people responded vigorously to the survivor's plight. The calf was named Phoenix, and she became an individual rather than an anonymous nonhuman. Browne's report gives a feeling of the atmosphere at the time:
But pleas to spare Phoenix flooded in. The Mirror launched a campaign to "Save Phoenix from the Ashes". Animal rights groups and actress Carla Lane threw in their support. Anthony Gibson, regional director of the National Farmer's Union, said the calf 's slaughter would "make King Herod look like a humanitarian". Tony Banks, Labour MP and former Government Minister, spat: "I was extremely angry. The idea of slaughtering this animal was totally unacceptable. The officials from Maff [Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food] are Daleks." (Browne, 2001) Such was the countrywide sympathy for the survivor that newspapers and backbench MPs warned that her slaughter could mean a loss in the general election for the ruling Labour Party (Browne, 2001 ). The Sun newspaper had a picture of Prime Minister Tony Blair and a gun sight focused on Phoenix with the caption, "Vote Labour or the calf gets it!" (Browne, 2001) . Policy was changed and, although the government insisted the timing was a coincidence and nothing to do with this case, the change meant that Phoenix was allowed to live and did so, in the end, as an international celebrity (Browne, 2001 ).
Conclusion
It is clear from the above that embedded in the nonhuman animal farming industry are conditions that have the potential for facilitating some degree of moral disengagement in consumers. There may well be others, and this is worthy of further investigation. The majority of people who support nonhuman farming are not what we would describe as evil, and Bandura (2002) gives this salient overview concerning human violence:
The findings from research on moral disengagement are in accord with the historical chronicle of human atrocities. It requires conducive social conditions rather than monstrous people to produce atrocious deeds. Given appropriate social conditions, decent, ordinary people can do extraordinarily cruel things. (p. 109) In the case of nonhuman farming, consumers do not actually have to do anything violent or abusive themselves but only have to support an industry that does it on their behalf. Further work in this area might also focus specifically on individual consumers in order to elucidate their perceived degree of personal engagement with, and responsibility for, what happens in the industry. This would give some idea of whether people are actually making fully cognizant decisions in relation to farmed nonhumans or whether there is a disjunction for them between their acts and the ethical consequences of their acts.
Considering the conditions outlined above, however, advocates working for the betterment of nonhumans in farming-or the total demise of the industry altogether-may be able to develop more effective strategies to bring about the moral reengagement of consumers, and a few possibilities are set out below.
Positive Roles. Whenever and wherever possible, it is important that nonhuman farming be portrayed as abusive in its essential character, even in its supposedly more benign forms such as "free range," "traditional," or "grass fed." It needs to be apprehended by the public as a system in which nonhumans are held captive, mutilated, controlled, impregnated, castrated, and killed. It follows from this that individuals working in the industry are active in a project that is abusive to beings who are helpless to resist and calls into question the legitimacy of such roles as the farmer, the butcher, and the shopkeeper without personally attacking the individuals concerned. As these are learned, positive roles, there are many interventions that could be initiated in children's literature, children's TV, and in schools. The question needs to be posed both publicly and directly to educators whether it is ethical deliberately to mislead children about the lives lived by the nonhumans they consume. This is likely to be a controversial issue promoting debate.
Channels for action. Powerful business interests and government boards are likely to resist strongly any reduction-not to mention abolition-of the channels available for legal abuse. It might be possible, via strategic arguments in court cases, however, to bring about small, incremental legal changes leading to farmed nonhumans eventually being recognized as individuals. The next stage would be recognition as legal persons and then, building upon what has gone before, as sentient beings deserving of basic rights. This is likely to be a long road, but it would have the effect of progressively closing off some of the already established and accepted pathways for abusive practices.
Justification and advantageous comparison. One arena where hierarchical thinking with respect to nonhumans can be challenged with a good chance of success is science. Here descriptions such as "lower animals," "less evolved," and "humans and animals" work to construct a biological hierarchy that is fundamentally at odds with the evolutionary theory of mainstream scientific thinking. Although such terms are used in teaching and in textbooks, they do not stand up to scientific interrogation. Given the powerful position of science in society, eradicating such imagery might have an important long-term effect.
Distance. Companies that show representations of nonhumans on nonhuman products could be required to display only pictures that are a true depiction of the way in which the farming has actually been carried out. To do otherwise, it can be argued, is a misrepresentation of the truth. Cartoon portrayals, such as happy cows printed on milk containers, would not be allowed for the same reason. The age of killing and the method of killing could also be required on the package, as well as the geographical area where the nonhuman lived.
The use of media in reducing psychological distance is very important, although it might be argued that many consumers of nonhuman products would prefer that the distance remain and might choose not to view or listen to programs specifically about nonhumans. This is where news items, talk radio, columns in magazines, letters, and such things as open rescues might play a part.
Linguistics. Changing the language used in relation to farmed nonhumans has the potential to undermine current dominant, oppressive discourses and foreground alternatives. Even the simple substitution of words such as "flesh" for meat, "baby flesh" for veal, "abused nonhumans" for farm animals, "dead calf 's milk /mother's milk" for milk, and "body parts" for meat products resists the dominant discourses and opens a space for engagement. It is important to refuse to use terms that suggest an implied purpose for the nonhuman's life such as "veal calf," "broiler," or "farm animal."
Deindividuation and responsibility. In helping to establish personal responsibility, the fundamental cause-and-effect relationship needs to be emphasized whenever possible-that the person who buys nonhuman products is funding abuse and that when individuals stop buying the products, the abuse will end. When individual farmed nonhumans are referred to, they should always be given a name, as should their parents, siblings, and offspring. This is an entirely defensible action, as humans frequently name nonhumans such as companions, horses, elephants, and even some nonhumans such as "Dolly the sheep" who have been used in experiments.
These and other strategies can be effective in bringing about moral reengagement in some people, thereby generating a greater sense of personal accountability and connection to the nonhumans whom they consume in different ways
